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I. INTRODUCTION
Liquid hydrocarbon deposits often extend across national frontiers
in such a manner that an entire deposit may be exploited, wholly or in
part, from either side of the boundary line.' This "characteristic of liquid
hydrocarbons has been a fundamental cause of disputes, conflicts, and
even wars in many parts of the world. As the economies of nation-states
grow more dependent on this relatively cheap energy source, the
likelihood of conflict will increase unless an international legal regime can
be developed to resolve these disputes on a fair and equitable basis and
upon which future treaties and agreements may be predicated. As a result,
this area of law has increasingly attracted the attention of legal scholars
and the international legal community.2
Because of the major impact this subject has on geopolitics and the
world economy, it is difficult to understand why the most recent United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, did not
squarely address the issue of liquid hydrocarbons. Although the 1982
UNCLOS specifically addresses some transboundary marine resources,
such as submarine hydrocarbon deposits, it does not address the
transboundary element of hydrocarbon deposits between two or more
states or, between states and special zones.3
Although hydrocarbon market prices have fluctuated dramatically,
experts predict that demand for this relatively cheap energy source and
1. Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L.
215, 215-16 (1979).
2. Id. at 215.
3. Alberto Szekely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary Hydrocarbon
Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico, 26 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 733, 738-43 (1986).
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chemical feedstock will grow significantly.' As a result, pressure to
develop transboundary energy reserves will also increase, and conflicts
will be difficult to avoid. Thus, the development of transboundary
hydrocarbon resources requires the attention of specialists to provide an
adequate legal regime in order to prevent future conflicts.5 These legal
regimes must also promote efficient and environmentally sound
exploitation by those nations involved.
6
The issues of delimitation and exploitation of transboundary liquid
hydrocarbon deposits are a branch of international law that has immense
global impact but, surprisingly, has remained quite stagnant with relatively
few exceptions.' This paper will attempt to give the reader a basic
understanding of oil and gas exploration and extraction principles,
summarize the existing international case law on transboundary oil and gas
deposits, review developing trends, and postulate some rules for possible
inclusion in the next United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Alleviating the existing confusion surrounding the law of transboundary oil
and gas deposits might help to defuse the international tensions associated
with the indefiniteness of the current legal regime concerning
transboundary oil and gas deposits.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Basics
Due to the migratory properties of oil and gas, liquid hydrocarbon
deposits often extend across national boundaries in such a manner that the
entire deposit may be exploited from either side of the boundary line.8 In
this respect, deposits of fluid hydrocarbons differ from hard mineral
deposits which are separated into discrete units by a state's frontier or
boundary. 9  Transboundary oil and gas deposits, clearly, "[d]o not
conform well to property lines, licensing demarcations or political
boundaries.",,"
4. Alberto Szekely et al., Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources: The Puerto Vallarta
Draft Treaty, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 609, 613 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
8. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.
9. Alberto E. Utton & Paul D. McHugh, On an Institutional Arrangement for Developing
Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 717, 722 (1986).
10. Id.
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Oil and gas deposits are typically composed of porous rock
bounded by impermeable strata which trap the hydrocarbons usually under
high pressure. Drilling through the impermeable cap decreases the
reservoir pressure allowing the oil and gas to migrate through the porous
media to the source of lower pressure. This source is usually the newly
drilled well. The fluids are then propelled to the surface by the hydraulic
pressure of the water table exerted on the deposit and the expansion of gas
trapped in the liquids. One can achieve a similar result by shaking a bottle
of soda and then decreasing the internal pressure by opening the cap.
This production of hydrocarbons under the reservoir's own
pressure is called primary production. Based on empirical data, primary
production is usually capable of recovering fifteen to twenty-five percent
of the oil in the deposit." By using secondary recovery methods, such as
injecting gas or water into the well, well pressures can be maintained and
recoveries of up to eighty percent may be achieved.'2 Newer, more
complex and costly methods of enhanced recovery, known as tertiary
recovery, include surfactant flooding, carbon dioxide flooding, steam
injection, and fire flooding 3 can further increase recoveries.
Over many years, the United States has developed some rules of
law, consisting of federal and state statutes, that address the problem of
adjacent land owners exploiting transboundary oil and gas deposits."' The
rules center around an attempt to develop the deposit as a single unit with
the cooperation from all other property interests in the deposit. 5 This
method of exploitation allows for optimum geologic placement of wells
and produces maximum hydrocarbon recovery from the deposit.
B. The Early Years of Oil and Gas Law in the United States
A brief explanation of the development of oil and gas law in the
United States may provide some perspective on possible solutions to
transboundary oil and gas problems and issues in the international arena.
During the period of the development of oil and gas law in the United
States, the courts lacked "adequate understanding of the physical
properties of oil and gas . . . and the subsurface structures containing
11. Will R. Knedlik, Introduction to U. S. - Mexico Transboundary Resource Issues, 26
NAT. RESOURCES J. 661, 683 (1986).
12. Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 722.
13. Id.
14. Larry S. Eubanks & Michael J. Mueller, An Economic Analysis of Oklahoma's Oil and
Gas Forced Pooling Law, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 469, 470 (1986).
15. Id. at 469.
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them."' 6 Consequently, courts used the Rule of Capture, by way of
analogy to migratory wild animals and marine life, as the basis of law for
transboundary oil and gas deposits." The courts held that liquid
hydrocarbons, within transboundary deposits, belonged to the land owner
who extracted and controlled them, regardless of whether the
hydrocarbons being extracted on A's property had initially come from
beneath B's property.' In essence, B's property rights in oil and gas
beneath his land were conditional upon his extraction and control of them.
In fact, B's property rights extended to that portion of the deposit beneath
A's property if B could extract and acquire them from his side of the
boundary. Thus, the only solution an owner apparently had, if he was to
retain the hydrocarbons that lay beneath his property, was to drill first and
fast in order to extract and control the hydrocarbons before his neighbor
did.'9 Consequently, the early law created incentive to drill as many wells
as quickly as possible in order to maximize individual production from the
deposit, usually at a neighbor's expense. This self-serving and haphazard
race to drill wells and produce the underlying oil and gas unnecessarily
reduced the pressure in these reservoirs and, thus, reduced overall
hydrocarbon recovery." Little regard was given to the most efficient and
effective development of the reservoir as a whole unit.
Spacing legislation eventually was passed limiting the number of
wells that could be drilled per acre.' This was followed by legislation
regulating the production from each well based on overall market demand
for hydrocarbons.2  These legislative acts helped maintain reservoir
characteristics which maximized recovery of the deposit and thereby
conserved the resource. Also, the legislation, by regulating production in
an attempt to establish a balance between oil and gas supply and demand,
helped to stabilize declining prices. 3
16. Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 722.
17. Id. at 722 n.28.
18. Id. at 722.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 723.
21. Utton & McHugh, supra note 9, at 723 n.32.
22. Id. at 723.
23. Id.
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C. Forced Pooling and Unitization
The most cost effective method of maximizing production from oil
and gas deposits requires the strategic placement of wells in the deposit.24
By properly placing wells based on the physical and geological
characteristics of the entire deposit, favorable reservoir characteristics can
be maintained and production is thereby maximized.' Unitization, as it
was called, requires all land owners to submit to development of the entire
hydrocarbon deposit as a unit.26 The trend has been toward compulsory
unitization because of the obvious problems associated with voluntary
unitization.
Unitization and forced pooling" promote drilling and production
by allowing a producer to force other nonconsenting lease holders within
the specified drilling area to participate in the drilling activities as either 8 a
full working interest partner, wherein the land owner would have a
percentage ownership in the well and bear the burden of his fair share of
expenses, or as a royalty interest owner, wherein the producer would pay
the land owner a one-time state determined bonus plus a royalty interest in
lieu of ownership.29 While there is no international law on the subject of
joint management schemes, the United States law of unitization can be
used to make a persuasive argument for its regular international use by
analogy. Unitization was used internationally with success in some of the
North Sea operations.'
Rainer Lagoni suggests that international state practice, as
reflected in common deposit arrangements in the past, may support the
emergence of a customary rule of international law that would require
states to cooperate in the exploration and exploitation of common deposits
of oil and gas.3' If this were accomplished, and the 1982 UNCLOS
required unitization for transboundary oil and gas deposits, the result
would lead to maximized recovery (value) for all concerned parties,
minimized waste, and minimized environmental concerns and operating
24. Id. at 724.
25. Id. at 723.
26. Eubanks & Mueller, supra note 14, at 470.
27. Id. at 469.
28. Id. at 470 n.3.
29. Id. at 471.
30. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
(Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340, 383 (1969); see Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS 1280-82 (3d ed. 1993).
31. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 243.
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costs because transboundary deposits would be developed as a whole unit.
It is also likely that a single operator would develop the deposit which
would eliminate the duplication of effort and costs associated with multiple
operators.
D. Marine Based Subsurface Hydrocarbon Deposits
Marine based subsurface hydrocarbon deposits pose a different set
of problems. These problems usually concern the delimitation of the
boundaries of the continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) between the adjacent or opposing nation-states." The first problem
is delimitation ,of the continental shelf.
E. Continental Shelf: Delimitation - The Drawing of Boundaries
Article 83 of the 1982 UNCLOS deals specifically with the
delimitation of the continental shelf between nation-states with opposite or
adjacent coasts. 33 In essence, it says that nation-states engaged in the
delimitation of adjacent or opposite boundaries of their continental shelves
shall do so by agreement in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) "[in order to achieve an equitable
solution."" This provides little direction except to advise states that it is
up to them to negotiate.
The adoption of a bargaining process, rather than a more
mathematical approach to delimiting the continental shelf area leads some
experts to believe that Article 83 was intentionally left vague by the states
during negotiations. It is further believed that it was motivated by greed
for the resources within the shelf.35 Under the current system it may be
possible for states with stronger bargaining positions to end up with more
than their fair share of the continental shelf and its resources at the expense
of others. However in many instances, it is all too probable that
agreement will not be reached, and this will result in dispute, gridlock, or
submission to the International Court of Justice for resolution.'
It seems as though the drafters of the 1982 UNCLOS have not
taken a definitive posture on this contentious issue. Perhaps this was done
32. See Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.
33. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on Dec. 10,
1982, art. 83, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
34. Id. at 1286.
35. Szekely, supra note 3, at 741.
36. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1231.
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to accommodate as many states as possible with a watered down agreement
in order to get the requisite number of states to ratify the treaty and deal
with the tough issues later, or to sit back and wait for the states themselves
to create law on the issue of continental shelf delimitation by their customs
and practice over time.
F. High Seas Exploitation of Natural Resources
The freedom to fish remains one of the oldest freedoms of the
sea.37 The 1982 UNCLOS confirmed the freedom of fishing for all states
and their people, but also recognized the need to regulate and conserve the
living resources of the seas.38 Articles 116 through 118 address states'
rights and duties of fishing, conservation of living resources of the seas,
and cooperation and management of those living resources.39
1. Who Owns the Resources of the High Seas?
An attitude already exists that the living resources in the water
column of the high seas have always been available to all nations. That
attitude has yet to extend to the minerals on and beneath the seabed. At
present, the option to explore and extract minerals from the seabed is
available only to those few nation-states who have adequate technology and
financial resources. However, given that technology and financial
resources are readily available, the resources must be able to be exploited
in a commercially economical manner in order to make the effort
worthwhile.
As high technology reduces the cost and increases the commercial
viability of exploration and extraction of minerals in the deep waters of the
seas, the legal question becomes: Who is, or should be, entitled to exploit
these resources and under what bases and limitations? ' What is needed is
a legal regime that will give incentive to the nations with the technology
and financial resources to exploit the seabed, ensure that a state's claim is
protected against encroachment by other nations, and assure that those who
take the risks will be able to reap the rewards."' As with other branches of
the law, it is virtually impossible to define the entire legal regime prior to
allowing exploitation to begin; however, some basic rules become
necessary if conflicts are to be avoided. The law should then develop
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1308.
41. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1308-09.
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naturally based on practice or custom and the treaties that are formed
between nations. It should be noted that General Assembly Resolution
2574D (XXIV) (1969) deals with the Moratorium on Exploitation of
Resources of the Deep Seabed. The United States challenged the statement
of law reflected in the resolution and the authority of the Assembly to
declare a "moratorium.
42
In the 1982 UNCLOS, Articles 136 through 140 address the
mining of natural resources of the seabed. Articles 136 and 137 state that
the seabed area of the high seas and its resources are for the common
heritage of mankind and that no state, natural person, or juridical person
shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the
area or its resources. 3 Any attempt to acquire such rights will not have
legal recognition by the appropriate authority." Article 139 specifies that
joint and several liability will apply to parties who, while acting together,
fail in their responsibilities or duties to maintain compliance with the
Convention which results in damages to other parties. 5 Article 140
specifies that seabed mining in the high seas shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole. This article also provides that equitable
sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in
the high seas area shall be made on a nondiscriminatory basis. '
2. Share the Bounty-Share the Cost?
Some may argue that the seabed resources belong to all the nations
of the world, and that even though they may be exploited by a few nations
that are financially capable, they should be made available to all. The
international marketplace and international commerce have already created
a system of distributing wealth based on supply and demand which, in
turn, determines price and availability. However, some regulation may be
necessary to ensure the world's access to these resources. Perhaps all
nations should have the opportunity to participate in the bounty of the
seabed by either sharing in the cost of exploitation or by being afforded the
opportunity to purchase these minerals at fair market value. 7 The same
42. Id. at 1316.
43. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, supra note 33, arts. 136, 137.
44. Id.
45. Id. art. 139.
46. Id. art. 140.
47. When dealing in global economies, even something apparently as simple as deciding on
a fair market price is problematic. Price is usually a function of local market demand and, varies
based upon the geographic location of the nation wishing to purchase. This complication allows
one to look more favorably upon the joint participation scenario.
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guiding principles that govern transboundary resources should apply to
seabed exploration: duty of good faith and cooperation, duty to share
data, duty to protect the environment, and the duty to avoid wasteful
practices in order to conserve the resources.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES
Liquid mineral deposits that extend across national frontiers on
land or a dividing line on the continental shelf between adjacent or
opposite states have increasingly attracted attention in international law
during the late 1960's and 1970's." An emerging legal concept of
cooperation -between neighboring states has already occurred when two or
more states share water resources. '9 It appears likely that this concept of
cooperation will be extended to transboundary hydrocarbon deposits.'
The 1982 UNCLOS does not address the transboundary element of
these deposits between nation states and special zones;51 therefore, nation-
states are left to their own devises within the context of a few guiding
principles to formulate a solution. Several principles have developed over
time and proven useful in transboundary issues, such as consultation and
negotiation toward the conclusion of agreements for joint cooperation, the
principle of adequate and effective exploitation, the principle that the
coastal state may enter into joint cooperation schemes without
relinquishing its rights over that part of the deposit on its side of the
delimitation line, the emerging principle of equal sharing in benefits
derived from the exploitation of the transboundary deposit, and the
emergence of the principle of unitization."2
Mexican-U.S. experience in the field of transboundary
resources has contributed to some of the guiding
international principles ruling the use and conservation of
transboundary resources, namely: the duty of each
country at either side of the border, when exploiting its
part of the resource conceived as a natural unity, to refrain
from producing a sensible harm; the principle of equitable
48. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.
49. Id. (quoting INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE FIFTY-SECOND
CONFERENCE HELD AT HELSINKI 1966, 477 et seq. (1967)). See also OSCAR SCHACHTER,
SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES 64, 74 (1977); Symposium, U.S. - Mexican Transboundary
Resources, (pt. II) 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. (1978).
50. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 215.
51. Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
52. Id. at 766.
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and rational utilization; and the duty to undertake previous
consultations and to exchange information. 3
These principles constitute "good neighborliness."-"
Mexico proposed the concepts of good faith and non-abuse of
rights at the third UNCLOS.55 These concepts are basic to transacting
business between nations and should be directly incorporated in the legal
regime of transboundary resources. Hard mineral deposits across frontiers
are dealt with in reference to territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights, and
territorial integrity.
A. Legal Concepts
1. Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights
"The territorial sovereignty of nation-states extends to the mineral
resources in the soil and subsoil of their land territory and territorial sea to
an unlimited depth."' "This exclusive authority exists whether or not the
deposit has been discovered or the state is able or intends to exploit it.""
No nation-state may exercise rights over these mineral resources without
consent of the state under whose territory they reside.58 This holds true as
well for mineral resources within the territory of the continental shelf;
however, in that situation nation-states have exclusive sovereign rights
rather than full territorial sovereignty over the resources. 9 Although the
literature makes a distinction between sovereignty and exclusive sovereign
rights, none will be made for purposes of this discussion.'
53. Knedlik, supra note 11, at 683.
54. See Szekely, supra note 3, at 738.
55. Id.
56. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 216 (citing L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 462 (8th
ed. H. Lauterpacht, 1955); I, 2 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 99
(H. Bonfils, 8th ed. 1925)).
57. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 216.
58. Id.
59.. Id. (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ 3, at 22 (Feb. 20). See also
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499
U.N.T.S. 311. The state's authority over the mineral resources of its land territory and
territorial sea is based on the concept of territorial sovereignty as an essential part of its legal
personality, whereas its sovereign rights over the mineral resources in the soil and subsoil of its
continental shelf are derived from the geographical concept of natural prolongation. d. at 31.
60. Id. at 216.
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2. Territorial Integrity
Territorial integrity is a "necessary corollary to the principle of
territorial sovereignty.""' It protects the sanctity of a nation-state's
territory from unauthorized invasion by another nation-state. 6  For
example, this principle would be violated by the unauthorized mining
through the boundary line by state A into part of a shared deposit residing
within the territory or continental shelf of state B or by state A conducting
mining operations within its boundary which results in material damage to
the territory of state B.63 The rule of law that another state is responsible
for material damage it causes to another state's territory has been
developed by analogy to the damage to a state by extraterritorial effects
such as air and water pollution."
Violations of the principle of territorial integrity for oil and gas
deposits are especially difficult to establish.' Complicated characteristics
of these deposits such as equilibrium of rock pressure, gas pressure, and
underlying water pressure affect the extraction process to the extent that
extracting hydrocarbons at one point will inevitably change conditions
within the entire contiguous deposit. '  Thus, this character of
transboundary fluid hydrocarbon deposits often creates tension even
between nations who may have enjoyed the best of relations in the past. In
this author's opinion there has been some suggestion and speculation in the
media that land based transboundary hydrocarbon issues were, in part,
responsible for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
3. Territorial Sea
Once states had acknowledged the idea of a territorial sea about
the coast, they had to address themselves to the matter of its breadth.
61. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.
62. See, Lagoni, supra note 1.
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id. (citing Gunther Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational
Pollution, 69 AM. J. INTL. L. 50, 72 (1975)). The author inferred this rule from extensively
discussed principles and concepts, basing it on well known precedents and state practice, such as,
the principle of territorial integrity, the emerging principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
the concept of good neighborliness as representing an expansion of the principle of abuse of
rights, and, inter alia, the Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 22 (Apr. 9), and the Trail Smelter
Arbitration, 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905, passim.
65. Id. at 217.
66. Id. at 217 (quoting Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1209,
1219 (1937-38)); HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS 1-12 (3d ed. 1974).
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Territorial sea limits varied over historical time and were based on such
theories as the line-of-sight doctrine, the cannon-shot rule, and the marine
league doctrine.67 These doctrines have outlived their usefulness. Based
upon the principles for which they were originally formulated, where does
one draw the boundary line now?
In 1793, the United States became the first country to adopt a three
mile limit in its domestic laws." Later the three mile limit generally
became recognized by international treaty and was accepted by nation-
states until the early 1960's. Although it was recorded by the 1930 Hague
Conference as common practice,' it was never codified. 70  The ILC
suggested a twelve mile upper limit in its 1956 report, but it did not
specify any specific limit between three and twelve miles.7 ' In accordance
with the 1982 UNCLOS, every nation-state has the right to establish the
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding twelve nautical
miles, measured from the low water line along the coast unless otherwise
provided .72 As a matter of course, the limit is generally set by states at
twelve nautical miles.73
4. Continental Shelf
"The concept of national jurisdiction over a continental shelf
beyond the territorial sea is relatively modem in origin, usually being
traced to the 1945 Truman Proclamation."7 4 The 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf defined the continental shelf "[t]he seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where
the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas. "7 Later, in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized the continental
shelf of the coastal state as a "[n]atural prolongation of its land territory
existing ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land,
67. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1240.
68. Id. at 1241.
69. Id. at 1240-44.
70. Id. at 1242.
71. Id. at 1243.
72. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1245.
73. Id.
74. Ernst Willheim, Australia - Indonesia Seabed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a
Joint Development Zone in the "Timor Gap", 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 826 (1989).
75. ZDENIK J. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 89
(1958).
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and as an extension of it, an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources.""
5. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
Louis Henkin notes that during the negotiations for the 1982
UNCLOS, extensive pressure from states with varying interests at stake
led the Convention to adopt the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).77
Articles 55 through 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS establish and define the EEZ
at 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea.78 The EEZ
gives the coastal state sovereign rights, but not sovereignty, 9 for certain
sanctioned activities such as for the purpose of exploring, exploiting,
conserving, and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, on the seabed, in the subsoil, and the superjacent waters. The EEZ
also gives coastal states rights to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone.' All other states enjoy freedom
of navigation, overflight, and other lawful acts associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft, submarine cables, and pipelines that are
compatible with the 1982 UNCLOS.8"
Although the 1982 UNCLOS does not specifically designate the
EEZ as part of the high seas, the United States and other maritime states
believe the convention reflects the general understanding that, as a matter
of customary law as well as under the convention, their rights and
freedoms of navigation, overflight, and laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, are available to other states in the EEZ and are the same as on
the high seas. However, the rights of noncoastal states to participate in
fishing and other commercial activity is subject to the special rights of the
coastal state.82
76. Willheim, supra note 74, at 826 (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Feb. 20)).
77. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1291.
78. Id. at 1293.
79. For purposes of this discussion, there is no discernible distinction between sovereign
rights and sovereignty for minerals beneath the continental shelf.
80. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1292 (citing U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 65, U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982); reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982), art. 56).
81. Id. at 1292 (referring to Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 514,
cmts. b, c, d, e (1987).
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6. Contiguous Zone
Kenneth P. Beauchamp states that "[tihe theory of free ocean use
beyond the territorial sea became subject to certain recognized exceptions
in a belt of water adjacent to, and extending seaward from, the territorial
sea.83 Initially during time of war, a coastal state would stop and search
vessels nearing its coast."' This activity grew into state enforcement of
various other specific functions in line with its economic and trade interests
and activities, such as a state's concern for drug running close to its shores
or territorial sea.8
William W. Bishop, in a paper prepared for the sixth conference
of the Inter-American Bar Association in 1949, justifies the expansion of
control of the coastal state over the seas adjacent to its coast:
The exercise of jurisdiction in contiguous zones of the high
seas becomes necessary in view of the inadequacy under
modern conditions of any reasonable breadth of territorial
waters; whatever we may regard as the breadth of
marginal sea now accepted under international law, there
are occasions and purposes for which jurisdiction must be
exercised farther out from shore. This differs from an
attempt to declare such areas territorial waters subject to
the full sovereignty of the coastal state.8
Bishop describes a state's sovereign rights as distinguished
from sovereignty in what is now known as the Contiguous
Zone. Article 33 of the 1982 UNCLOS defines the
Contiguous Zone as that area of sea, contiguous to its
territorial sea, in which a nation state may exercise control
necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory or territorial sea. The contiguous zone may not
extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the
83. Kenneth P. Beauchamp, The Management Function of Ocean Boundries, 23 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 611, 633 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. William W. Bishop, Jr., The Exercise of Jurisdiction for Special Purposes in High
Seas Beyond the Outer Limit of Territorial Waters (paper prepared for the Inter-American Bar
Association, Sixth Conference, Detroit, May 1949), reprinted in 99 CONG. REC. 2493 (1953).
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baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured."
7. High Seas
Principles of common usage and freedom once governed all the
seas. Emergence of the territorial sea and other special zones reduced the
areas subject to the regime of the high seas. Further reduction in the area
governed by the principles of the high seas resulted as an exclusive
economic zone, and archipelagic states were recognized. The high seas
are reduced even further by the special purpose zones that are specifically
designated for scientific research and pollution control, etc., and by states'
sovereign rights in extended continental shelves beyond the 200 mile limit
of the EEZ.18 Articles 86 through 90 of the 1982 UNCLOS define the
EEZ and some of the rights of its use.
As technology allows drilling efforts to take place in deeper water,
resolution of ownership of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits across the
EEZ and the high seas will become an issue for which nations should
prepare. There will be many concerns, such as: who has rights to that
portion of hydrocarbons beneath the high seas; who is responsible for the
costs associated with extraction of that portion of the hydrocarbons beneath
the high seas; on what basis will production be allocated, and to whom will
it be allocated? These appear to be simple questions until it is realized
that, in theory, the entire global community of states has rights to the
resources of the high seas.
8. Joint Development Zone (JDZ)
States may designate joint development zones (JDZ) by agreement
absent the desired agreement on boundary delimitation: Article 83 section
3 of the 1982 UNCLOS provides that parties "[p]ending agreement .. .
the states concerned . . . shall make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature."" This type of arrangement permits
business and commerce to continue by allowing exploitation of the natural
resources so that they may be utilized by both states while the delimitation
of the boundary is still in dispute. Upon entering into a joint development
arrangement most states are concerned that any interim arrangement does
87. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on Dec. 10,
1982, art. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1276 (1982)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
88. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1297.
89. UNCLOS, supra note 87, at 1276.
Reynolds
not prejudice its long term interests toward a favorable delimitation.
While agreeing on the delimitation of the JDZ is a substantial task, the
more formidable task is that of applying the legal and administrative
systems of both states to the JDZ so that all the attributes of sovereign
rights of both states are effectively combined.
This situation also presents the possibility, and the potential
danger, of discovering hydrocarbons on the boundary of one of the states
and the JDZ. This possibility will be a sufficient reason to enlarge the
JDZ at the expense of narrowing that state's continental shelf area,
diminishing the JDZ to the detriment of the other state, or to work out
some sort of equitable arrangement to avoid a conflict. As desirable as it
might be to have a definitive set of rules to apply to a boundary dispute
situation, there will always be exceptions. Why not just let legal precedent
evolve naturally by treaty and custom? Joint development is a workable
situation, but only if the nation-states involved have the intention of
making it work.
9. Functional Zones
The functionalistic view of the state doctrine based on territorial
sovereignty is that it is inappropriate for the resolution of international
conflicts over global issues. Therefore, functional zones provide a state
with control for limited purposes not based on sovereignty, but rather,
based on specific sovereign rights that have been granted.' The EEZ can
be said to be a functional zone since the state only has exclusive rights to
the resources of the water column, the seabed, and the subsurface
minerals, but not sovereignty over this area.
B. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: The Law of the Sea
Generally
A law of the sea is as old as nations, and the modern law of the sea
is virtually as old as modem international law. For three hundred years, it
was probably the most stable and least controversial branch of international
law. It was essentially reaffirmed and codified as recently as 1958. By
1970, it was in disarray.9
"An early and basic principle of the law of the sea was that of
freedom. The sea could not be acquired by nations and made subject to
90. Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 633.
91. Paul D. McHugh, International Law - Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, 25 NAT.
RES. J. 1025 (1984) (quoting Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 212 (2d ed. 1979));
HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1231.
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national sovereignty. "I Coastal states have recently sought to increase and
expand their jurisdiction over their adjacent sea areas through different
zones of jurisdictional control articulated in the United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).93
The law of the sea was largely customary law, until it was codified
and developed by the International Law Commission in a major
undertaking culminating in the first United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1958. That Conference adopted conventions: on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, on the
Continental Shelf, and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas .1'
In the decades following the 1958 UNCLOS, worldwide changes
necessitated a rewriting." In 1973, following the U.N. General
Assembly's effort in dealing with the resources of the seabed beyond
national jurisdiction, the third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference was
convened at which virtually the whole law of the sea was reexamined."
Eight years of negotiations produced the Draft Convention on the Law of
the Sea which was considered virtually complete.' However, the
provisions on the contentious issue of seabed mining were largely
rejected.98 A final draft of the UNCLOS was approved on April 30, 1982,
by a vote of 130 states in favor, 4 against, and 17 abstentions. The United
States, Israel, Turkey and Venezuela voted against the final draft." It is
interesting to note that Turkey and Venezuela were embroiled in
continental shelf delimitation disputes during this time."® The Treaty
received the necessary 60th ratification on November 16, 1993, ' and
came into force in 1994. "Insofar as the Convention merely codifies
customary law, it reflects law binding also on states that have not adhered
to it." 0
92. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1029.
93. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1289.
94. Id. at 1232 (citation omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1313.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Receives Sixtieth Ratification to
Enter into Force in One Year, United Nations Office of Legal Affairs SEA/1396/Rev. 1, (Nov.
19, 1993) (sixtieth ratification received on November 16, 1993).
102. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1232.
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This Convention is significant in that it enables a coastal state to
establish an EEZ beyond its territorial sea. The state's EEZ may extend
200 nautical miles from its territorial sea baselines, within which it has
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of the water column and the seabed. The coastal state also has
jurisdiction in the EEZ for purposes such as the protection of the marine
environment.' 3 It also adopted a two part definition of the continental
shelf: either 200 nautical miles from the base lines from which the
territorial sea is measured, or to the limits of the actual continental shelf
beyond 200 nautical miles through the prolongation of the state's land
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.'" In the latter case,
a wealth sharing system operates in which the coastal state makes
contributions to an escrow fund for distribution based on its production of
the non-living resources beyond the 200 mile limit.'" This raises an
interesting question of whether the state has sovereign rights in the water
column of its continental shelf extending beyond the 200 mile limit.
C. Jurisdiction
Traditionally, international law divided the seas into two legal
categories: those under sovereignty of the coastal states; and the high
seas.'" In the recent past, however, coastal states have sought to increase
and expand their jurisdiction over their adjacent sea areas.' 7 This
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction has changed people's perception of
the sea and the applicable law."'° The seas have been divided into different
legal regimes, with the principle of common usage applicable only in the
areas beyond national jurisdiction where the high seas begin."° Difficulties
and conflicts can sometimes arise in the overlap areas, over which more
103. Willheim, supra note 74, at 826 (citing Official Records of the Third United Nation
Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter
Official Records]).
104. Id. at 827 (citing Official Records at 33, art. 76).
105. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1285 (1982) (article 76). The contributions are to begin
after the first five years of production at that site. In the sixth year, the rate of payment or
contribution is one percent of the value or volume of production at the site. The rate increases by
one percent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year and remains at seven percent
thereafter. Id. See also HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1279-80.
106. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1028.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1029.
109. Id.
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than one nation state has jurisdiction because of these recent extensions of
coastal states' jurisdictions."10  In these areas of dual or multiple
jurisdiction, which law should govern in the delimitation of the boundary?
These are some of the useful but difficult questions to answer.
D. Customary International Law
Customary international law is comprised of two distinct elements:
general practice, and its acceptance as law."' As you can imagine, the
development of sufficient practice among nations and its acceptance as a
means of legal precedent is a painstakingly slow process. In 1958, the
International Law Commission codified customary practices in the first
UNCLOS. 2
E. International Treaty Law
"Some debate exists as to whether treaties should be viewed as a
source of international law or merely as a source of obligation, much like a
contract. "I In the former case, treaties would set legal precedent.
Insofar as these Treaties reflected current world views on the subject
matter of transboundary hydrocarbon resources, it would be consistent to
view the doctrines embodied in these treaties as emerging international
law.
Although treaties governing transboundary resources describe
unique situations between nations, common issues consistently arise." 4 In
the event that these common issues are treated by nations in relatively the
same manner, the solutions should and would be considered to be
emerging principles of international law.
The reality of the situation is that issues of transboundary
resources between nations are resolved with each nation having its
particular socioeconomic interests in mind. We are, therefore, not likely
to see the solutions to these problems themselves emerge as law, but,
rather, the guiding principles used in arriving at specific solutions appear
to be the substance of the emerging law."'
110. See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30. See also Lagoni, supra note 1; UNCLOS, supra
note 33.
111. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1029 n.26.
112. HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1232.
113. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1030 n.35.
114. Szekely et. al., supra note 4, at 609.
115. Id.
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F. International Case Law
"Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
requires the Court to apply judicial decisions, subject to the provisions of
Article 59, as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Article 59 states that decisions of the Court are not binding except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case. The Court's decisions,
therefore, are not governed by the principle of stare decisis.""16 However,
this does not mean that the Court ignores precedent. It uses precedent as a
persuasive argument rather than a binding one. If the Court does not
follow precedent, those cases are likely distinguished from the one at
bar." 7
1. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
A partial delimitation of the continental shelf had been in effect by
agreement in 1965, between Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany on the
basis of equidistance from the nearest points on the baselines of the
territorial seas of the parties." '  Agreement could not be reached on the
remainder of the boundaries because of differences over the rules to be
used.' " The Netherlands and Denmark asserted that due to lack of
agreement between the parties and absent special circumstances, the
principle of equidistance should be used.'20 Germany responded that the
equidistance method would not lead to a just and equitable solution and
that delimitation should be governed by equitable principles. 2' The court
left the final solution of delimitation to the parties and limited itself to
providing criteria that the parties would take into account during
negotiations including "[t]he physical and geological structure, and natural
resources, of the continental shelf areas involved."' 22
The court further stated in its decision, that the parties should
resolve their differences by agreement, "[o]r failing that, by an equal
division of the overlapping areas, or by agreements for joint exploitation,
the latter solution appearing particularly appropriate when it is a question
116. McHugh, supra note 91, at 1032 nn. 43-45.
117. Id. at 1025.
118. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
340 (1969). See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1280-82.
119. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
340 (1969).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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of preserving the unity of a deposit." ' The court also said that it "[d]oes
not consider that unity of deposits constitutes anything more than a factual
element which it is reasonable to take into consideration in the course of
the negotiations for a delimitation."24 Even at this early stage of resolving
transboundary issues, it appears that preserving the unity of the deposit as
a means of economic and efficient exploitation was recognized but that it
did not rise to the level of creating a special circumstance and that, in and
of itself, would not alter the boundary delimitation." 5
2. United Kingdom/France Arbitration
France and the United Kingdom engaged in negotiations between
1970 and 1974, with the purpose of delimiting the continental shelf that lay
between them.' 6 The negotiations resulted in only limited agreement and
the dispute was submitted to an arbitration commission by agreement in
1975." ' The matter at issue in the arbitration had to do with the meaning
of "special circumstances."' 28 Although the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the North Sea Cases stated there "[i]s no legal limit to the
considerations which states may take account of for the purpose of making
sure that they apply equitable procedures . . ." it subsequently determined
that the presence of hydrocarbons within the continental shelf alone was
not sufficient to invoke special circumstances unless the parties otherwise
provide by agreement.'29 Thus, it would not be sufficient to require a
delimitation of boundaries based on equitable principles.
3. Greece/Turkey Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case
In 1974, Turkey granted petroleum research permits and began to
explore for oil and gas in the Aegean Sea outside the territorial sea of
islands belonging to Greece. 30 Greece did not recognize Turkey's claim to
123. Id.
124. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.
340 (1969).
125. Id.
126. Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (Fr. v. U.K.), 18 I.L.M. 397
(1979).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11),
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 985 (1976); see, HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 820.
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that portion of the seabed.' 3' Subsequently, the parties engaged in
unsuccessful negotiations.'32 Turkey then proceeded to send further
scientific expeditions to the same area escorted by warships.133 This action
prompted Greece to submit the dispute to the ICJ in 1976. 3
Greece wanted not only a delimitation of the continental shelf
between the two countries in the Aegean Sea, but also prevent Turkey
from acquiring knowledge of the strata under Greece's continental shelf.35
Turkey avoided the ICJ proceedings on jurisdictional grounds."'6 In terms
of the development of international law, it is unfortunate that the ICJ did
not have jurisdiction because the court would have had to address the
problem of transboundary hydrocarbon resources within the scope of this
dispute. ,3
4. Iceland/Norway Conciliation Recommendations on the
Continental Shelf Area Between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island.
Jan Mayen Island belongs to Norway and lies 292 miles off the
coast of Iceland.'38 The island is of volcanic origin, and its year round
population is about 30 to 40 residents.'39 The island received little attention
until Icelandic fisherman netted a large catch of fish off its shores in
1978.'40 This raised the question of Jan Mayen's right to an EEZ and a
continental shelf as contemplated in the UNCLOS then being drafted.' 4'
Although Norway's title to Jan Mayen was by act of Parliament in 1929,
Norway did not claim a 200 mile EEZ around the island when it
131. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.
985 (1976).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Sept. 11), reprinted in 15 I.L.M.
985 (1976).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen (Ice. v.
Norway), 21 IL.M. 1222 (1982).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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established one around the mainland.' 2 Norway's rush to correct its
oversight in 1978, drew immediate objections from Iceland. ' 3
The parties agreed to refer the matter to a three member
conciliation commission.'" Each of the parties would appoint one
member, and the third would be jointly selected., 5 The commission was to
recommend a dividing line taking into account Iceland's strong economic
interests in the seas in that area, and the pertinent geographical and
geologic factors.'" Because of the geology, the commission disregarded
the prolongation principle, proportionality, and the median line. ,41
A scientific committee was assembled to determine the potential
for hydrocarbon deposits in the disputed area.'" The commission
ultimately suggested a detailed joint development zone comprised of the
areas with the highest potential for hydrocarbons.' 9 The establishment of a
joint venture exploitation agreement was based on the principle of
unitization.'"° The Court again, as in the North Sea Cases, recognized the
importance and, in fact, depended on unitization for the most effective and
economic recovery."'
5. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case
Tunisia and Libya submitted its question to the ICJ to determine
exactly the principles and rules of international law which may be applied
in delimiting the continental shelf between them. Both nations also wanted
the Court to specify precisely the practical manner in which the principles
should be applied so as to be able to accomplish the delimitation without
difficulty.' In this case the Court reiterated the natural prolongation
principle, but did not specify the concept of "equitable principles" or
142. Id.
143. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222
(1982).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222
(1982).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Elliot L. Richardson, Jan Mayen in Perspective, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 443
(1988).
152. Agreement to Submit Question of the Continental Shelf to the International Court of
Justice (Libya v. Tunis.), 18 I.L.M. 49 (1979).
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"special circumstances" and for that reason the two dissenting judges on
the Court criticized the judgment as lacking in legal principle.' 53  The
Court came to the conclusion that the existing economic status of the
parties may not be taken into consideration as part of "relevant
circumstances" when delimiting the boundary. However, "[t]he presence
of oil wells in an area to be delimited may, depending on the facts, be an
element to be taken into account in the process of weighing all relevant
factors to achieve an equitable result."' 54
6. United States/Gulf of Maine Case
The essence of the Gulf of Maine case was a delineation of natural
resources of both the seabed and the fisheries in the boundary area near
George's Bank.' 5  The ICJ actually drew the boundary line once the
applicable rules and principles were determined. The United States and
Canada requested that the Court use a single line to delimit both the
continental shelf and the 200 nautical miles fisheries zone. 15
6
Historically, the jurisdiction over fisheries has been asserted on the
basis of geography, and jurisdiction over the minerals in the continental
shelf has been based on geology.'57 The Court formulated the general
principles of equity applicable to a fair allocation of the resources between
neighbors and fashioned a solution which was basically the average of the
requests initially made by the parties.'58
7. Libya/Malta Case
In 1982, Libya and Malta requested the ICJ to decide the
principles and rules of international law that were applicable to the
delimitation of their respective continental shelves. Additionally, they
requested that the court outline the practical application of these principles
such that the Parties could delimit the areas without incident.'59 This was
153. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya) 1982 I.C.J. 2, (Feb. 24),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225, 288 (1982).
154. Id. at 255.
155. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.),
1984 I.C.J. No. 67 (Oct. 12); Thomas J. Trendl, Maritime Delimitation and the Gulf of Maine
Case: A Guide for the Future of Merely 'Slicing the Pie?', 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 599 (1988).
156. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, supra note 155.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Special Agreement for the Submission to the International Court of Justice of a
Continental Shelf Dispute (Libya v. Malta), May 1976, 21 I.L.M. 971 (1982).
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the same problem in the Tunisia/Libya case only without the prejudicial
influence of natural resources.
In 1956, Malta asserted that it informed Libya of its intention to
delimit its continental shelf by means of a median line."6 Libya's silence
was interpreted as acquiescence which Malta claimed precluded Libya in
law from challenging the validity of Malta's position. 6 Malta also wanted
the Court to take into account the relative economic position of the two
states and the range of Malta's fishing activity. The Court refused to do
this, stating that such conditions are totally unrelated to the applicable rules
of international law.'62 The Court gave greater weight to distance criteria
where the distance between the two opposing coasts is less than 400
nautical miles. 63
8. Australia/Indonesia Seabed Case
A dispute over a portion of their common continental shelf area
arose between Australia and Indonesia. There was overlap of their EEZs
because the shelf distance between the two countries was less than 400
nautical miles. Australia asserted jurisdiction over its shelf based on the
theory of natural prolongation of its land territory, as was promulgated in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.' Indonesia asserted jurisdiction
based on the 200 nautical miles EEZ.' 6 Under the 1982 UNCLOS, the
extension of the land mass in a prolongation of the shelf appears to be a
primary basis for continental shelf jurisdiction on the basis of sovereign
rights and not sovereignty. Also, the 200 nautical miles EEZ is based on
sovereign rights so it might be argued that these two states are on about
equal footing regarding their assertions of jurisdiction."
The parties chose to resolve their differences in the disputed area
by adopting a temporary three part Zone of Cooperation within which joint
development activities were to proceed under different legal and economic
sharing regimes. 67
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1203.
164. Willheim, supra note 74, at 828.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 840.
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G. Delimitation of Continental Shelf Boundaries
As we have seen, the delimitation of boundaries in the continental
shelf can be rife with problems. It seems that for every scientific way that
might be proposed to dissect the disputed area, exceptions can be
envisioned. For example, since the EEZ establishes sovereign rights in a
200 nautical mile belt of ocean measured from the base of the territorial
sea, one can easily see that nation states divided by a body of water less
than 400 nautical miles will not yield each state its requisite 200 nautical
mile EEZ. Islands, close to shores of another state, pose a similar
problem.
States whose continental shelves extend beyond the 200 nautical
mile EEZ have been given partial sovereign rights in the minerals beneath
the shelf.'1 This early attempt at designing a rudimentary set of rules
actually created some conflicting situations. For example, states could
each have a valid method and argument for delimiting its continental shelf.
However, the application of the method proposed by each state might
produce an incongruous result, as in the case of Iceland and the island of
Jan Mayen. Application of Iceland's 200 nautical miles EEZ would have
encroached on the sovereign rights of Jan Mayen's EEZ since they were
only 292 nautical miles apart."
The relevant question becomes: In the face of all of the possible
configurations of nation how does one arrive at a fair and equitable result
in the delimitation of boundaries where hydrocarbon deposits are present?
The author of this article agrees with Beauchamp's philosophy when he
states: "The division of ocean space according to political ideas of
boundary-making does not always relate to -logical ocean management
purposes." 70  Rather than boundary-making being about a quest for
extending a nation state's territory, it should reflect the functional purposes
for which the boundaries are being drawn.
168. See HENKIN ET. AL., supra note 30, at 1279-80.
169. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21 I.L.M. 1222
(1982).
170. See Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 656.
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H. Delineation of Boundaries of Subsurface Fluid Hydrocarbon
Deposits
1. Volume of Subsurface Hydrocarbons Residing within Each State
Fluid mineral deposits spanning across national boundaries cannot
accurately be determined without the cooperation of all nation states
involved. Geological data is needed for delimitation of the deposit
boundaries which is likely available only from the individual states under
which the deposit resides. The legal literature does not spend much time
discussing the determination of the extent of the deposit. However, this is
an important piece of information when calculating the allocation of
production for each state. This is not so much an issue of technical
acquisition of the data but rather an issue of the cooperation necessary
from all parties involved. Cooperation is necessary in almost every facet
of data acquisition, drilling, production, transportation, and processing of
the hydrocarbons. Success of the project depends entirely on the level of
cooperation and trust that the parties are willing to give to one another.
2. Non-Homogeneous Deposits or Processing of Comingled
Hydrocarbons Originating from Separate Deposits
Although the literature consistently assumes that hydrocarbon
deposits are homogeneous, this is not always the case. Different parts of a
reservoir may produce hydrocarbons of different composition and,
therefore, different relative value. If, for example, an equal volume of the
deposit resides beneath two adjacent states and one side of the deposit
contains more valuable hydrocarbons than the other, that side should be
appropriately compensated in the allocation process. In structuring
allocation agreements, information regarding deposit composition is
critical.
Also, in the situation where offshore production platforms produce
hydrocarbons from different deposits and comingle these fluids in a
common pipeline for transport to a processing center and tanker loading
terminal, it is critical to know both the amount of production and its
composition to determine the proper allocation of value. After the
hydrocarbons have been processed, a nation state's objective should be to
receive the same value of products as the value of the raw hydrocarbons
they put into the pipeline less, of course, any agreed upon losses.
The legal property issues associated with commingling are
nonexistent if the allocation agreement is based upon value. In the end the
[Vol. 1
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parties should find that the value taken out of the system is equal to the
value put into the system, striking a value balance.
L Maximizing Recovery of Hydrocarbons as a Function of
Exploitation Methods Used
The percentage of recovery of hydrocarbons from the deposit is
directly related to the exploitation methods used. Earlier we saw how
unitization allowed strategic placement of wells based upon geological
formation in order to maintain favorable reservoir characteristics for as
long as possible. Also, producing from the reservoir at a rate that
optimizes reservoir pressure allows maximum recovery over the life of the
reservoir. However, maximum recovery may not be the result desired by
some nation states. Sometimes developing nations are more concerned
with the rapid production of cash to pay national debts than they are with
maximizing recovery over the life of the reservoir. Prime examples of this
practice are Iraq and Iran.
The most profitable situation for nation states would be to
maximize the present value of all future income streams.' Income
streams will vary as a function of production rates. Production rates vary
as a function of well-head pressure and well-head pressure will, in turn,
affect total hydrocarbon recovery over the life of the reservoir. Thus,
there is a delicate balance of producing enough oil and gas to satisfy
current cash requirements while tempering that behavior with the
knowledge that the deposit must be operated in a manner that will continue
to supply specific future demand for cash. This disparity between the
attitudes of nation states over cash flow can be a significant source of
problems in joint ventures where each state operates its own production
facility from the common deposit.
If we are to establish a legal duty toward operations, it must
necessarily be linked with good faith efforts to conserve the resource, to
minimize adverse impact to the environment, operate safely for all
concerned, and consider the cash requirements of each state. How states
choose to weigh these attributes depends on the specific circumstances of
the situation.
171. This depends on many factors such as speculation on the future price of oil and a
discount rate for calculating present value. Recognize, also, that maximizing the present value of
future income streams from the deposit may require operation outside the envelope of prescribed
operation in order to maintain other factors in line. For example, maximizing present value
based on estimated future petroleum prices may require producing from the deposit at a rate that
is not consistent with maximizing recovery nor may it even be consistent with existing legal
requirements regarding wellhead operation.
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J. A State's Liability to Adjacent States for Inefficient Recovery:
International Claims for Damages
Lagoni suggests that if mining operations conducted on one side of
the boundary were to cause material damage on the other side, the
principle of territorial integrity would be violated.' The rule that material
damage to the territory of another state gives rise to state responsibility
developed mainly with regard to extraterritorial environmental effects,
especially air and water pollution. It appears, however, to be equally
applicable to the extraterritorial effects of mining or extraction
operations.' One possible type of resulting damage would be that other
nation states would be unable to extract-the minerals from their part of the
deposit, even if the first state has extracted only that portion originally
situated in its territory or continental shelf.'74 Another type of damage
would be inefficient or wasteful exploitation which may sometimes be
determined by "mass balances" over the system.' The theory behind the
concept of the mass balance states that an operator should be able to
account for the whereabouts of all hydrocarbons coming from the well-
head on a daily basis.
IV. POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE MULTI-STATE
MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBON RESOURCES
A. Differing Perspectives on Natural Resource Management
1. Maximize Current Income or Maximize Total Value of Natural
Resource Deposit?
As mentioned previously, sometimes a nation states' operations
criteria are at odds with another's fiscal policies regarding natural resource
deposits. One state may want to maximize current income and the other,
with less need for current income, may want to maximize the total value of
the resource. It seems the duty to conserve the resource deposit would
imply a duty to maximize the total value of the deposit. Optimal recovery
in a timely manner with regard for the environment and the minimization
of waste would appear to play primary roles in determining the overall
plan for exploiting the deposit.
172. Lagoni, supra note 1, at 217.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. A mass balance is a mathematical engineering device which allows the engineer to
ensure efficient recovery and to either predict and account for any losses.
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It may be argued, however, that the degree of wealth of the nation
state should play a part in the decision of how to exploit the deposit. In
the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, the Court ruled that economic
considerations cannot be taken into account in delimitation of the shelf and
that they are extraneous circumstances and could easily change.'7 6
However, a state's current and future cash requirements may be valid
criteria for use in proposing an equitable production plan after delimitation
of the boundary is accomplished. Making a production plan requires the
determination of how fast to exhibit the deposit. This will have a direct
bearing on cash flow and ultimately the stability of the state's economy and
the welfare of its people. If natural resources are considered a sovereign
source of wealth, should not the state decide how best to exploit that
wealth to meet its needs?
2. Joint Resource Development Versus Single State Development,
Operational Control, and Resource Management
In joint development of natural resources in transboundary areas,
there are as many alternatives as the mind can conceive. This endless
array of possibilities should be tempered by the administrative
requirements and equitable principles. As in the Australia/Indonesia
dispute in the Timor Gap, the parties chose a three part temporary zone of
cooperation in the disputed area, each with different legal and economic
regimes governing them.'" The possibilities of cooperative agreements are
limited only by imagination, ingenuity, common sense, and the
determination to achieve an equitable solution.
B. What Price for Development?: The Environmental Pollution
Issue
The act of drilling for oil in the continental shelf necessitates
considerable measures for pollution control. Upsetting the ecological and
chemical balance of the region can have far reaching and serious
consequences on marine life, the marine environment, and on nation states
whose economies depend heavily on the fruits of the sea.
If the exploiting states through their negligence harm the marine
environment, how and where will the harm manifest itself? What types of
monitoring will be done to safeguard the environment and help to timely
recognize changes and trends in quality of the environment? Where will
176. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. 2 (Feb. 24), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 225, 288 (1982).
171. Willheim, supra note 74, at 828.
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the monitoring be done? How often and at what cost? Using what
technologies? To what degree should the pollution from marine drilling
activities be abated? Will this effort be a joint effort or will each nation
state be responsible for its own pollution abatement activities? How will
success of the pollution abatement activities be measured? What remedies
are available to states who have suffered damages from the exploitation
efforts?
These questions are easy to pose but much more difficult to
answer. A full discussion of these issues could be the subject of a legal
treatise and will not be dealt with here. Rather, these questions are meant
to be thought provoking in a way that empowers the parties to answer
them in the planning stages of the development rather than administering
an ad hoc approach to pollution abatement.
C. Migration of Fluid Hydrocarbons Across State Borders - Whose
Property ?
The migratory properties of subsurface fluid hydrocarbons give
nation states an incentive to unitize the development so that the deposit is
treated as a whole for exploitation purposes. Then, optimal strategic well
placement will maintain favorable reservoir characteristics and maximize
recovery of hydrocarbons over the life of the deposit. One project
operator can then be selected for the exploitation of the deposit which will
avoid duplication of drilling, production, administrative activities, and
associated costs.
Unitization also avoids the problems associated with property
rights in migratory hydrocarbons. A state's share of the unitized
production will be determined by the value of recoverable oil and gas in
place beneath property for which that state has sovereign rights as a
percentage of the value of the entire deposit. This is, by far, the best
approach to take in terms of simplicity, cost effectiveness, maximization of
hydrocarbon recovery from the deposit, and for the policy reason that it
fosters an environment of cooperation between the parties.
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V. EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF CONVENTIONAL LAW
A. New Approaches to Drawing and Making Ocean Boundaries
1. Multiple Boundary Regimes
The state practice of negotiating maritime boundary delimitation is
a recent one and developing trends can be witnessed.' While the
traditional political rationale of drawing a hard definitive boundary line
served a purpose in the past, these hard lines have outlived their usefulness
in today's global society. It may be more beneficial to enter into
agreements where one of the adjacent nation states is responsible for
exploration and exploitation of minerals of the continental shelf because of
the overriding technological advantage that one state may have. On the
other hand, it may be necessary to think of shelf delimitation not in terms
of drawing one line, but rather in terms of drawing several lines to
accomplish different objectives in the most cost efficient and
environmentally sound manner that maximizes resource recovery. For
example, the shelf boundary might be different for exploitation and
management of fisheries than it would be for exploitation and management
of minerals. 9
If the overall objective in these boundary regions is to maximize
wealth, " minimize costs, minimize adverse effects on the environment,
and maximize overall resource recovery over the life of the operation then
extensive cooperation is needed between states.
2. Evolving Principles of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resource
Law and Trends in State Practice
There has been an evolution of the body of customary international
law surrounding transboundary hydrocarbon resources, which is embodied
in treaties. In 1979 a multinational team of experts in international law
and geology met under the auspices of the School of Law and the Natural
Resources Center of the University of New Mexico for the purpose of
researching the international law applicable to the utilization and
conservation of submarine transboundary hydrocarbon resources and to
178. Beauchamp, supra note 83, at 653.
179. Id.
180. 1 am speaking here of the time value of wealth. But this should be governed by any
overriding concerns for minimizing costs, minimizing adverse effects to the environment, and
maximizing resource recovery.
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observe trends in that law.'8 ' In preparing a draft treaty that could be used
as a model for future treaties on transboundary hydrocarbon deposits they
referred to numerous conventions and treaties on the subject. They put
forth the following nine guiding principles in order to ensure proper
coordination of these activities for the benefit and protection of the rights
and interests of all concerned parties:
1. The duty of cooperation between the Parties to
ensure the continued attainment of the purposes and
objects of the Treaty;
2. The duty of good faith and good neighborliness of
each of the Parties in the undertaking of their respective
activities, in the mutual coordination of such activities and
in the compliance with the guiding principles and criteria
established pursuant to this Treaty;
3. The duty not to take advantage of or use their
respective national laws and regulations and applicable
rules of international law in such a way as would
unnecessarily impede the equitable and reasonable
utilization and distribution and conservation of
transboundary hydrocarbon resources;
4. The duty of each of the Parties to abstain from
undertaking activities within its jurisdiction or control that
may cause damage to the resources or the environment of
the other Party, or that may create an unreasonable risk in
that respect;
5. The duty of the Parties to consult with each other
on a continuing basis in order to secure the coordination of
activities which is the main purpose and object of this
Treaty;
6. The duty of each of the Parties to provide the other
with prompt notification of its intention to undertake any
activities relating to transboundary hydrocarbon deposits;
7. The duty of the Parties to exchange all
information, data and publications relevant to maritime
181. See Szekely et al., supra note 4, at 609.
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transboundary hydrocarbon deposits and the purposes and
objectives of this Treaty. The use of proprietary
information exchanged between the Parties shall be subject
to the conditions of confidentiality established by the Party
providing such information;
8. The duty of the Parties to cooperate with each
other in order to prevent waste of maritime transboundary
hydrocarbon resources and to prevent or abate
environmental pollution or damage stemming from
activities relating to maritime transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits; and
9. The duty of the Parties not to undertake any
unilateral or bilateral activities contrary to their obligations
under international law, whenever a transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit extends across their common
maritime boundary, or extends into the subsoil of the
seabed under the jurisdiction of a third State, or in the
subsoil of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. 82
VI. CONCLUSION
The business of producing oil and gas from the seabed floor is
complicated enough without having to further confound the issue with
transboundary deposits. However, as advances in technology promote a
rush to explore the marine areas of the continental shelf and seabed of the
high seas, we must be prepared to resolve the resulting legal, social, and
economic issues. Not only must we pro-actively resolve existing disputes,
we must search for consensus on how to manage the large, but ultimately
limited, ocean resources.
As the socioeconomic needs of nation states evolve, so should our
thinking about the payout that the act of drawing hard boundaries yields.
Boundaries tend to isolate nations and individuals from the real issue of
how nation states are going to inhabit this planet in meaningful way and in
a spirit of trust and cooperation. If we must draw boundaries, let us draw
boundaries that make sense for the function for which they were intended.
For example, the boundary that makes sense for demarcation of the
territorial continental shelf, may not make sense for fisheries management.
182. See Szekely et al., supra note 4, at 634-35.
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We should be ready to apply sound judgment and equitable
principles to address the needs of all parties concerned notwithstanding the
obligation all nation states have regarding the ecology. The principles and
duties of good faith, cooperation, unitization of the transboundary deposit,
ecological interests, conservation of the resource, sharing of data,
abstention from wasteful or uneconomic activities, and the desire to make
joint efforts work will do more toward promoting a workable solution than
any measure of scientific application of hard and fast rules.
However, we must recognize that we now understand some of the
current and future issues of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. We must
be prepared to develop a regime of cooperation as a context for resolving.
disputes. Disputes happen most often because people do not listen to the
needs of the other parties. States must listen for one another's needs and
use the information to negotiate on a fair and equitable basis.
Based on what we know about transboundary hydrocarbon deposits
today, we can accurately predict where the conflicts of tomorrow will be.
We have a duty to plan the legal regime of transboundary natural resources
with this foresight as a guide.
